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	 To	view	this	fact	sheet	visit	http://osuextra.okstate.edu/
dept/econ/mktingoutlook.shtml	 along	 with	 its	 companion	
F-597,	“Captive	Supply	Trends	since	Mandatory	Price	Report-
ing.”	F-597	compared	what	was	known	about	captive	supplies	
prior	to	mandatory	price	reporting	(MPR),	largely	from	Grain	
Inspection,	 Packers	 and	 Stockyards	 Administration	 data,	
versus	what	has	been	learned	in	the	three	years	since	MPR	
began	in	April	2001.	MPR	data	on	prices	and	volumes	are	
reported	by	meatpackers	to	the	Agricultural	Marketing	Service	
(AMS)	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	Agriculture	(USDA).
	 While	the	previous	publication	focused	on	the	volume	or	
quantity	of	captive	supplies,	this	one	examines	price	relation-
ships	between	various	 types	of	procurement	or	marketing	
methods,	some	of	which	constitute	captive	supplies.	Lastly,	
results	are	reported	from	recent	analyses	of	now-available	
data	regarding	price	impacts	associated	with	captive	supplies	
since	MPR.	
Pricing Method Data from Mandatory 
Price Reports
	 Recall,	captive	supplies	refer	to	slaughter	livestock	that	
are committed to a specific buyer (meatpacker) two weeks or 
more	in	advance	of	slaughter.	The	three	most	common	types	
of	 captive	 supply	 methods	 include	 marketing/purchasing	
agreements,	forward	contracts,	and	packer	feeding.
	 	As	discussed	 in	F-597,	MPR	made	data	available	on	
various	methods	of	pricing	fed	cattle.	These	include	negoti-
ated,	 formula	priced,	 forward	contract,	and	packer	owned	
trades.	All	but	negotiated	trades	might	be	considered	a	form	
of	captive	supplies,	though	there	can	be	some	exceptions	to	
this	general	statement.	
	 Information	discussed	in	this	extension	fact	sheet	deals	
primarily	with	negotiated	pricing,	formula	pricing,	and	forward	
contract	 pricing	 of	 fed	 cattle.	 Price	 data	 are	 not	 reported	
for	packer	owned	cattle	since	packer	owned	 livestock	are	
transferred	from	one	business	area	of	the	company	(cattle	
feeding)	to	another	(slaughter-fabrication).	No	doubt	an	inter-
nal	transfer	price	is	assigned	to	the	packer	owned	livestock	
but	it	is	considered	proprietary	information	and	not	reported	
publicly.	However,	the	impacts	portion	of	this	extension	fact	
sheet	covers	packer-owned	trades	along	with	formula	pricing	
and	forward	contracts.
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Price Dynamics and Comparisons
	 Recall	 that	 negotiated	 pricing	 accounted	 for	 46.1%	
of	fed	cattle	procurement	or	marketing	over	the	three-year	
period	from	April	2001	to	April	2004.	Formula	pricing	aver-
aged	43.3%;	forward	contracting,	3.5%;	and	packer	owned	
cattle,	7.1%.	Knowing	the	extent	of	each	of	the	marketing	
or	procurement	methods	is	important,	but	more	important	
is	 comparing	 prices	 among	 those	methods.	 This	 section	
discusses	those	comparisons.
	 Summary	of	Prices –	Table	1	(page	6)	summarizes	prices	
for	each	of	the	procurement	methods	for	the	three-year	pe-
riod	since	MPR	began.	Note that in this extension fact sheet, 
year 2001 refers to April 2001 to March 2002, 2002 refers to 
April 2002 to March 2003, and 2003 refers to April 2003 to 
March 2004.	All	price	comparisons	are	on	a	dressed	weight	
basis. The five-state, weighted average price includes prices 
for	all	grades	of	fed	cattle.	The	states	comprise	the	major	
cattle	feeding	states	of	Texas-Oklahoma,	Kansas,	Nebraska,	
Colorado, and Iowa-So. Minnesota. The five-state weighted 
average	is	reported	both	for	steers	and	heifers	and	both	for	
live	weight	and	dressed	weight	trades.	It	could	be	argued	
that the five-state, weighted average price is the most com-
prehensive	and	most	representative	of	market	conditions	in	
the	cash	market,	both	 for	 live	weight	and	dressed	weight	
trades. Here, the five-state, weighted average price is used 
as	the	base	or	standard	for	comparing	prices	reported	by	
procurement	methods.
	 Negotiated	prices	on	an	annual	basis	and	for	the	three	
years	together	averaged	just	a	few	cents	per	hundredweight	
above the five-state weighted average price. Negotiated 
prices averaged as little as $0.04/cwt. higher than the five-
state	average	in	2002	to	$0.29/cwt.	higher	in	2001.
	 Formula	 prices	 averaged	 higher	 than	 other	 pricing	
methods or the five-state average in some years and lower 
in	others.	No	consistent	pattern	was	evident.	For	the	three-
year	average,	formula	prices	were	$1.43/cwt.	higher	than	the	
average	 for	 forward	contracts	and	$0.07/cwt.	higher	 than	
average	negotiated	prices.
	 Forward	contract	prices	varied	the	most	relative	to	the	
other	pricing	methods.	They	were	higher	than	all	other	price	
series	in	2001,	then	were	lower	than	some	in	2002	and	2003.	
In 2003, forward contract prices were significantly below 
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the	other	pricing	alternatives,	$6.02/cwt.	below	negotiated	
prices	and	$5.31/cwt.	below	formula	prices.	This	large	price	
difference	is	likely	related	to	the	rapid	upward	and	downward	
movement	in	prices	during	2003.
	 One	 of	 the	 major	 concerns	 with	 some	 producers	 is	
whether	or	not	there	are	special	“sweetheart”	deals	between	
packers	and	some	feedlots.	Given	the	annual	average	prices	
reported	here,	while	sweetheart	deals	may	exist,	there	is	no	
significant advantage on average with formula prices relative 
to	other	procurement	methods	or	the	more	broadly	reported	
five-state, weighted average price. However, the averaging 
process	may	mask	what	 is	 happening	 in	 reality.	 To	 know	
whether	or	 not	 that	 is	 the	case,	 transaction	prices	would	
be	required,	as	opposed	to	the	weekly	average	prices	used	
here.
	 Weighted	 Average	 Prices	 vs.	 Negotiated	 Prices 
–	Figure	1	compares	the	weekly	weighted	average	dressed	
steer	prices	vs.	negotiated	prices	for	the	three	years	since	
MPR	began.	While	it	appears	there	is	a	single	line	connect-
ing	weekly	prices	over	this	period,	in	actuality,	there	are	two	
lines.	However,	 the	 two	 lines	 are	 nearly	 indistinguishable,	
thus	indicating	virtually	no	difference	between	the	reported	
five-state weighted average price and the reported negotiated 
price	each	week.	To	some	this	may	not	be	a	surprise	since	
negotiated	prices	comprise	most	of	the	weighted	average	
price	series.	Still,	it	is	important	to	know	that	when	searching	
for	a	representative	price	for	fed	cattle,	there	appears	to	be	
little reason to select either the five-state weighted average 
price	or	the	negotiated	price.
	 Weighted	Average	Prices	vs.	Formula	Prices –	Again,	
one	of	the	big	concerns	for	many	supporters	of	MPR	was	
the	presumed	favorable	relationship	of	formula	prices	rela-
tive	to	negotiated	prices.	Figure	2	compares	the	weighted	
average	dressed	steer	price	with	formula	prices.	Unlike	the	
previous	comparison,	here	there	is	a	noticeable	difference,	
especially	in	some	weeks.	Do	those	who	formula	price,	which	
is	associated	primarily	with	grid	pricing,	receive	preferential	
prices?	The	answer	appears	to	be	yes,	sometimes,	and	no,	
sometimes.
	 As	discussed	from	data	 in	Table	1,	 the	price	difference	
on	average	is	just	a	few	cents	per	hundredweight	and	favored	
formula	prices	two	of	the	three	years	but	negotiated	prices	the	
other	year.	Some	explanation	can	be	gleaned	from	Figure	2.	
Five-state	weighted	average	prices	(and	negotiated	prices)	tend	
to	be	lower	than	formula	prices	on	a	declining	market.	Conversely,	
formula prices tend to trail the five-state weighted average 
prices	or	negotiated	prices	on	a	rising	market.	A	regression	
model of the price differences confirmed this observation. The 
difference	between	negotiated	prices	and	formula	prices	was	
negative	and	narrowed	(thus	favoring	formula	prices)	when	the	
market	trend	was	downward	and	was	positive	and	wider	(thus	
favoring	cash	prices)	when	the	market	trend	was	upward.
	 Understanding	how	base	prices	in	grids	are	discovered	
also	adds	to	the	understanding	of	the	price	differences	noted	
here.	Most	base	prices	 in	grids	are	 formula	priced	with	 the	
base	price	tied	to	last	week’s	cash	market,	either	a	reported	
cash	market	price	quote	or	the	average	cost	of	fed	cattle	at	the	
packer’s	plant	where	the	cattle	will	be	slaughtered.	Therefore,	
there should be a closer relationship between the five-state, 
weighted	average	price	and	last	week’s	cash	market	price,	than	
between this week’s five-state, weighted average price and 
this	week’s	formula	price.	One	way	to	explore	that	is	to	lag	the	
formula	price	one	week	so	it	matches	up	with	last	week’s	cash	
market	price.	Figure	3	shows	that	relationship.	The	two	lines	
in Figure 3 appear to fit more closely together than in Figure 2. 
Thus, significant-appearing price differences in some weeks in 
Figure	2	are	reduced	when	formula	trades	are	matched	more	
nearly	with	the	cash	market	prices	in	those	formulas.
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	 Weighted	 Average	 Prices	 vs.	 Forward	 Contract	
Prices –	Figure	4	compares	the	weighted	average	dressed	
steer	prices	with	forward	contract	prices.	Forward	contract	
prices	deviate	sharply	from	the	weighted	average	prices	in	
some	weeks.	This	likely	is	related	to	what	was	happening	in	
the	futures	market	for	any	given	week	during	this	three-year	
period,	market	expectations,	and	related	market	conditions.	
Futures	market	price	movements	are	not	discussed	here.
	 However,	understanding	forward	contracts	may	provide	
some insight into why prices may deviate significantly in 
some	weeks.	Most	forward	contracts	for	fed	cattle	are	basis	
contracts.	Packers	bid	a	futures	market	basis	in	the	month	fed	
cattle	are	expected	to	be	marketed.	Then	anytime	between	the	
date	cattle	are	contracted	and	before	delivery,	cattle	feeders	
may	pick	the	fed	cattle	price.	Thus,	cattle	feeders	watch	the	
futures	market	and	try	to	forecast	when	the	live	cattle	contract	
price	for	the	month	just	after	the	cattle	will	be	slaughtered	
has	peaked.	As	a	result	of	this	process	and	depending	on	
futures	market	price	behavior,	the	average	forward	contract	
price	may	or	may	not	be	close	to	the	current	weekly	cash	
market price, here the five-state, weighted average price.
	 Comparison	 of	Negotiated,	 Formula,	 and	 Forward	
Contract	Prices –	Comparing	each	of	the	price	series	for	pric-
ing	methods	to	the	broad,	weighted	average	price	is	important	
to	identify	similarities	and	differences	and	to	understand	those	
differences.	Figure	5	then	compares	the	three	pricing	method	
series	(negotiated,	formula,	and	forward	contract).	Summary	
observations	can	be	made	regarding	the	comparison.
	 First,	the	three	pricing	method	series	based	on	mandatory	
price	reports	by	packers	track	each	other	relatively	closely	
in	general.	Thus,	each	is	generally	representative	of	broad	
market	conditions	(termed	price	determination),	but	not	what	
might	be	affecting	prices	within	and	between	weeks	(termed	
price	discovery).	For	reasons	discussed	above,	less	reliance	
might	be	placed	on	the	forward	contract	price	series	as	an	
indicator	of	current	market	conditions.
	 Second,	no	single	pricing	method	is	consistently	higher	
or	 lower	 than	 any	 other.	 This	 seems	 especially	 important	
given	the	concerns	of	many	cattlemen	and	others	regarding	
captive	supply	prices	vs.	cash	market	prices.	Neither	of	the	
two	pricing	methods	that	are	typically	associated	with	captive	
supplies	are	consistently	above	cash	market	prices.	Each	is	
highest	at	times	and	lowest	at	times.
	 There	does	appear	to	be	differences	associated	with	ris-
ing	or	declining	prices	that	may	be	important	in	choosing	one	
marketing	method	over	another.	However,	the	consistency	
of	those	price	differences	over	varying	market	conditions	is	
not	explored	further	here.
	
Estimated Price Impacts  
of Captive Supplies
	 Information	presented	above	on	prices	and	in	F-597	on	
volume traded by pricing method seem to confirm that MPR 
increased	the	information	available	on	captive	supplies	and	
price	relationships	compared	with	the	previous	price	report-
ing	system.	That	data	also	allow	estimating	the	price	impacts	
from	captive	supplies.	A	brief	summary	of	previous	research	
results	is	presented,	followed	by	impacts	estimated	with	data	
since	MPR.	
	 	
	 Previous	Captive	Supply	Research	Findings – Briefly, 
here	is	the	situation	that	captive	supplies	create	and	the	crux	
of	the	issue	for	cattlemen	and	others.	When	buyers	purchase	
fed	cattle	by	captive	supply	methods,	the	supply	of	cattle	that	
can	be	purchased	in	the	cash	market	is	effectively	reduced	
by the volume already committed to specific packers. That 
alone,	would	likely	raise	prices	for	the	remaining	cattle	be-
cause	other	buyers,	those	without	captive	supplies,	need	to	
bid	aggressively	for	a	smaller	supply	of	fed	cattle.	However,	it	
also	means	that	buyers	with	captive	supply	cattle	committed	
to	their	plants	need	not	be	as	aggressive	in	the	cash	market	
because	they	already	have	a	portion	of	their	cattle	require-
ments	met.	That,	in	turn,	may	cause	cash	prices	to	decline.	
This	is	the	essence	of	the	captive	supply	debate.	Can	packers	
use	their	captive	supply	purchases	to	bid	lower	and	depress	
prices	paid	for	fed	cattle	purchased	in	the	cash	market?	Data	
collected	by	the	Grain	Inspection,	Packers	and	Stockyards	
Administration	(GIPSA)	have	enabled	the	most	detailed	ex-
amination	of	captive	supplies	to	date.	Results	from	a	captive	
supply model with five years of monthly captive supply data 
(1989-93)	for	the	U.S.	suggested	that	larger	plants	use	captive	
supplies	strategically	(Barkley	and	Schroeder).	Captive	supply	
usage	by	larger	plants	increased	as	cash	prices	increased	
but	not	for	smaller	plants.	Captive	supply	usage	increased	
as	cash	price	variability	increased,	more	so	for	larger	plants	
than	smaller	plants.	Captive	supply	usage	also	increased	as	
plant	utilization	increased.	Lastly,	for	larger	plants,	contract-
ing	and	marketing	agreements	were	substitutes	for	packer	
feeding.	Therefore,	 in	summary,	 larger	plants	used	captive	
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supplies	to	increase	plant	utilization	and	to	mitigate	rising	or	
more	variable	prices.	
	 In	one	of	the	short-term	impact	approaches	using	trans-
action	 data	 for	 1992-93	 from	 packers	 nationwide,	 results	
indicated	 there	was	simultaneity	 in	 the	decision	 to	deliver	
forward	contracted	and	marketing	agreement	cattle	and	the	
decision	to	purchase	cash	market	cattle	(Ward,	Koontz,	and	
Schroeder).	The	same	simultaneity	was	not	found	for	packer	
fed	 cattle.	 This	 suggests	 packers	 feed	 cattle	 for	 different	
reasons	than	they	used	contracts	and	marketing	agreements.	
Packer	 feeding	may	 have	 been	motivated	more	 by	 cattle	
feeding profit opportunities and maintaining a steady flow 
of	cattle	 to	 the	plant,	and	motivated	 less	by	using	packer	
fed	cattle	strategically	to	reduce	procurement	costs	via	its	
influence on cash market prices. Use of captive supplies 
was	associated	with	lower	prices	for	fed	cattle	generally	but	
the	amounts	were	smaller	than	many	cattlemen	expected,	
ranging	from	$0.01-$0.41	per	dressed	hundredweight.
	 Since	the	GIPSA	concentration	study,	economists	have	
continued	wrestling	with	the	captive	supply	issue.	At	least	
three	“theories”	of	captive	supplies	have	been	developed.	
While	there	are	differences,	all	suggest	captive	supplies	can	
be	used	strategically	by	packers.
	 GIPSA	commissioned	further	empirical	work	with	trans-
action	data	from	the	Texas	High	Plains	for	1995-96.	Findings	
were	similar	to	those	of	Ward,	Koontz,	and	Schroeder.	Cap-
tive	supplies	were	associated	with	a	small	negative	decline	
in	fed	cattle	prices	(Schroeter	and	Azzam	1999).	However,	
the	 authors	 proposed	 an	 economic	 argument	 indicating	
why	this	may	occur,	indicating	that	the	negative	relationship	
between	captive	supply	volume	and	cash	market	prices	may	
not	be	strategic	in	nature.	In	later	work,	Schroeter	and	Azzam	
(2004)	argue	the	negative	relationship	stems	from	the	tim-
ing	of	deliveries	to	packing	plants	from	cattle	feedlots.	They	
found	a	negative	relationship	between	volume	of	marketing	
agreement	deliveries	in	one	week	and	the	expectation	of	a	
price	change	from	the	previous	week.	
	 Estimated	Price	 Impacts	with	MPR	Data –	Several	
models	were	estimated	at	OSU	with	weekly	data	for	the	three-
year	period	since	the	beginning	of	MPR.	All	models	explained	
over 95% of the week-to-week variation in the five-state, 
weighted	average,	live	weight	fed	steer	price.	Model	results	
were	consistent	with	previous	research	in	some	regards	but	
differed	somewhat	in	others.	
	 Consistent	with	previous	research,	a	small	negative	re-
lationship	was	found	between	the	volume	of	weekly	formula	
priced	 trades	 and	 cash	market	 prices.	 As	 formula	 priced	
volume	increased,	cash	market	prices	declined	slightly.	This	
finding is consistent with the concerns expressed by many 
cattlemen	regarding	the	impact	of	captive	supplies	on	cash	
market	prices.	However,	the	magnitude	was	less	than	many	
cattlemen	expect,	similar	to	previous	research.
 No significant relationship was found between volume 
of	 forward	contract	cattle	 traded	and	cash	market	prices.	
Fewer	fed	cattle	were	marketed	by	forward	contract	than	any	
other	marketing	method	in	the	MPR	data	and	the	relationship	
between	forward	contract	prices	and	other	prices	was	not	as	
strong	as	the	relationship	among	other	pricing	methods.
	 This	research	also	considered	the	relationship	between	
the	extent	of	negotiated	pricing	and	cash	market	prices.	A	
reverse relationship was found compared with the finding for 
formula prices. A small but significant positive relationship 
was	found	between	the	volume	of	weekly	negotiated	trades	
and	cash	market	prices.	As	more	trades	were	negotiated,	
cash	market	prices	increased.	This,	too,	is	consistent	with	
those	concerned	about	captive	supplies	and	their	support	
for	returning	to	a	higher	percentage	of	negotiated	transac-
tions.
	 A	surprising	result	was	found	for	packer	owned	trades.	
The	models	 consistently	 indicated	 a	 positive	 relationship	
between	the	volume	of	packer	owned	cattle	delivered	and	
cash	market	price.	This	 is	opposite	what	most	cattlemen	
concerned	about	captive	supplies	would	expect.	Conceivably,	
the	decision	to	deliver	cattle	from	the	packer’s	own	inventory	
rests	more	with	feedlot	side	of	the	business	than	with	the	
packer	procurement	or	processing	side.	More	cattle	may	
be	delivered	when	cash	market	prices	are	high,	thus	show-
ing	better	returns	to	the	cattle	feeding	side	of	the	business.	
Packers	might	also	deliver	more	of	their	cattle	when	prices	
are	high	for	a	strategic	reason,	so	as	to	swing	supply-demand	
conditions	more	in	their	favor	and	lower	future	cash	market	
prices.
	 The	relationship	between	volume	traded	and	past	prices	
was	explored	further.	During	brief	periods	of	price	declines,	
the	volume	of	formula	trades	increased.	Opposite	conditions	
affected	deliveries	of	negotiated	and	packer	owned	deliver-
ies.	During	brief	periods	of	price	increases,	the	volume	of	
negotiated	and	packer	owned	deliveries	increased.
Conclusions
		 Mandatory	 price	 reporting	 increased	 the	 amount	 of	
data	and	information	available	on	various	pricing	methods	
and	quantities	traded	for	fed	cattle.	Comparisons	are	easier	
now	 than	 prior	 to	MPR	 between	 prices	 paid	 by	 packers	
for	fed	cattle	purchases	by	alternative	methods,	including	
methods	that	constitute	captive	supplies.	Data	also	enable	
more	regular	and	different	analyses	of	market	impacts	from	
captive	supplies	and	related	questions	than	previously.
 Preliminary analyses with weekly data for the first three 
years	of	MPR	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
•	 Differences	between	formula	prices,	 forward	contract	
prices,	and	negotiated	prices	were	generally	small	and	
varied	from	year	to	year.
•	 Differences	 between	 formula	 prices	 and	 negotiated	
prices	were	related	to	rising	and	declining	prices.	For-
mula	prices	were	higher	in	downward	trending	markets	
and	negotiated	prices	were	higher	in	upward	trending	
markets.
•	 Models	estimated	agreed	with	previous	research	that	
as	the	volume	of	formula	priced	trades	increased,	there	
was	a	small	negative	relationship	with	cash	market	fed	
cattle	 prices.	 Similarly,	 as	 the	 volume	 of	 negotiated	
trades	and	packer	owned	trades	increased,	there	was	
a	small	positive	relationship	with	cash	market	fed	cattle	
prices.
•	 Brief	 periods	 of	 declining	 prices	 tended	 to	 stimulate	
formula	trade	volume.	Conversely,	brief	periods	of	rising	
prices	tended	to	stimulate	negotiated	trade	and	packer	
owned	trade	volume.
	 Further	analysis	is	needed.	However,	clearly,	MPR	pro-
vides	additional	data	with	which	to	study	the	contentious	
issue	of	captive	supplies	and	their	market	impacts.
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supplies	to	increase	plant	utilization	and	to	mitigate	rising	or	
more	variable	prices.	
	 In	one	of	the	short-term	impact	approaches	using	trans-
action	 data	 for	 1992-93	 from	 packers	 nationwide,	 results	
indicated	 there	was	simultaneity	 in	 the	decision	 to	deliver	
forward	contracted	and	marketing	agreement	cattle	and	the	
decision	to	purchase	cash	market	cattle	(Ward,	Koontz,	and	
Schroeder).	The	same	simultaneity	was	not	found	for	packer	
fed	 cattle.	 This	 suggests	 packers	 feed	 cattle	 for	 different	
reasons	than	they	used	contracts	and	marketing	agreements.	
Packer	 feeding	may	 have	 been	motivated	more	 by	 cattle	
feeding profit opportunities and maintaining a steady flow 
of	cattle	 to	 the	plant,	and	motivated	 less	by	using	packer	
fed	cattle	strategically	to	reduce	procurement	costs	via	its	
influence on cash market prices. Use of captive supplies 
was	associated	with	lower	prices	for	fed	cattle	generally	but	
the	amounts	were	smaller	than	many	cattlemen	expected,	
ranging	from	$0.01-$0.41	per	dressed	hundredweight.
	 Since	the	GIPSA	concentration	study,	economists	have	
continued	wrestling	with	the	captive	supply	issue.	At	least	
three	“theories”	of	captive	supplies	have	been	developed.	
While	there	are	differences,	all	suggest	captive	supplies	can	
be	used	strategically	by	packers.
	 GIPSA	commissioned	further	empirical	work	with	trans-
action	data	from	the	Texas	High	Plains	for	1995-96.	Findings	
were	similar	to	those	of	Ward,	Koontz,	and	Schroeder.	Cap-
tive	supplies	were	associated	with	a	small	negative	decline	
in	fed	cattle	prices	(Schroeter	and	Azzam	1999).	However,	
the	 authors	 proposed	 an	 economic	 argument	 indicating	
why	this	may	occur,	indicating	that	the	negative	relationship	
between	captive	supply	volume	and	cash	market	prices	may	
not	be	strategic	in	nature.	In	later	work,	Schroeter	and	Azzam	
(2004)	argue	the	negative	relationship	stems	from	the	tim-
ing	of	deliveries	to	packing	plants	from	cattle	feedlots.	They	
found	a	negative	relationship	between	volume	of	marketing	
agreement	deliveries	in	one	week	and	the	expectation	of	a	
price	change	from	the	previous	week.	
	 Estimated	Price	 Impacts	with	MPR	Data –	Several	
models	were	estimated	at	OSU	with	weekly	data	for	the	three-
year	period	since	the	beginning	of	MPR.	All	models	explained	
over 95% of the week-to-week variation in the five-state, 
weighted	average,	live	weight	fed	steer	price.	Model	results	
were	consistent	with	previous	research	in	some	regards	but	
differed	somewhat	in	others.	
	 Consistent	with	previous	research,	a	small	negative	re-
lationship	was	found	between	the	volume	of	weekly	formula	
priced	 trades	 and	 cash	market	 prices.	 As	 formula	 priced	
volume	increased,	cash	market	prices	declined	slightly.	This	
finding is consistent with the concerns expressed by many 
cattlemen	regarding	the	impact	of	captive	supplies	on	cash	
market	prices.	However,	the	magnitude	was	less	than	many	
cattlemen	expect,	similar	to	previous	research.
 No significant relationship was found between volume 
of	 forward	contract	cattle	 traded	and	cash	market	prices.	
Fewer	fed	cattle	were	marketed	by	forward	contract	than	any	
other	marketing	method	in	the	MPR	data	and	the	relationship	
between	forward	contract	prices	and	other	prices	was	not	as	
strong	as	the	relationship	among	other	pricing	methods.
	 This	research	also	considered	the	relationship	between	
the	extent	of	negotiated	pricing	and	cash	market	prices.	A	
reverse relationship was found compared with the finding for 
formula prices. A small but significant positive relationship 
was	found	between	the	volume	of	weekly	negotiated	trades	
and	cash	market	prices.	As	more	trades	were	negotiated,	
cash	market	prices	increased.	This,	too,	is	consistent	with	
those	concerned	about	captive	supplies	and	their	support	
for	returning	to	a	higher	percentage	of	negotiated	transac-
tions.
	 A	surprising	result	was	found	for	packer	owned	trades.	
The	models	 consistently	 indicated	 a	 positive	 relationship	
between	the	volume	of	packer	owned	cattle	delivered	and	
cash	market	price.	This	 is	opposite	what	most	cattlemen	
concerned	about	captive	supplies	would	expect.	Conceivably,	
the	decision	to	deliver	cattle	from	the	packer’s	own	inventory	
rests	more	with	feedlot	side	of	the	business	than	with	the	
packer	procurement	or	processing	side.	More	cattle	may	
be	delivered	when	cash	market	prices	are	high,	thus	show-
ing	better	returns	to	the	cattle	feeding	side	of	the	business.	
Packers	might	also	deliver	more	of	their	cattle	when	prices	
are	high	for	a	strategic	reason,	so	as	to	swing	supply-demand	
conditions	more	in	their	favor	and	lower	future	cash	market	
prices.
	 The	relationship	between	volume	traded	and	past	prices	
was	explored	further.	During	brief	periods	of	price	declines,	
the	volume	of	formula	trades	increased.	Opposite	conditions	
affected	deliveries	of	negotiated	and	packer	owned	deliver-
ies.	During	brief	periods	of	price	increases,	the	volume	of	
negotiated	and	packer	owned	deliveries	increased.
Conclusions
		 Mandatory	 price	 reporting	 increased	 the	 amount	 of	
data	and	information	available	on	various	pricing	methods	
and	quantities	traded	for	fed	cattle.	Comparisons	are	easier	
now	 than	 prior	 to	MPR	 between	 prices	 paid	 by	 packers	
for	fed	cattle	purchases	by	alternative	methods,	including	
methods	that	constitute	captive	supplies.	Data	also	enable	
more	regular	and	different	analyses	of	market	impacts	from	
captive	supplies	and	related	questions	than	previously.
 Preliminary analyses with weekly data for the first three 
years	of	MPR	can	be	summarized	as	follows:
•	 Differences	between	formula	prices,	 forward	contract	
prices,	and	negotiated	prices	were	generally	small	and	
varied	from	year	to	year.
•	 Differences	 between	 formula	 prices	 and	 negotiated	
prices	were	related	to	rising	and	declining	prices.	For-
mula	prices	were	higher	in	downward	trending	markets	
and	negotiated	prices	were	higher	in	upward	trending	
markets.
•	 Models	estimated	agreed	with	previous	research	that	
as	the	volume	of	formula	priced	trades	increased,	there	
was	a	small	negative	relationship	with	cash	market	fed	
cattle	 prices.	 Similarly,	 as	 the	 volume	 of	 negotiated	
trades	and	packer	owned	trades	increased,	there	was	
a	small	positive	relationship	with	cash	market	fed	cattle	
prices.
•	 Brief	 periods	 of	 declining	 prices	 tended	 to	 stimulate	
formula	trade	volume.	Conversely,	brief	periods	of	rising	
prices	tended	to	stimulate	negotiated	trade	and	packer	
owned	trade	volume.
	 Further	analysis	is	needed.	However,	clearly,	MPR	pro-
vides	additional	data	with	which	to	study	the	contentious	
issue	of	captive	supplies	and	their	market	impacts.
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Table 1. Three-Year Summary of Weekly Prices from Mandatory Price Reports by Marketing Method ($/cwt.)	 	
	 	
 Summary Statistics 
Marketing Method Year* Average Standard Minimum Maximum
 or Data Series  Deviation  
Five-State	Weighted	 2001	 111.92	 6.84	 99.82	 128.69
	 Average	Steer	Price	 2002	 109.54	 9.76	 97.64	 128.73
	 	 2003	 135.62	 14.91	 117.11	 177.78
	 	 2001-2003	 119.03	 16.11	 97.64	 177.78
	 	 	 	 	
Negotiated	Dressed	 2001	 112.21	 6.80	 100.10	 129.00
		 Steer	Price		 2002	 109.58	 9.75	 97.64	 128.71
	 	 2003	 135.72	 14.96	 117.15	 178.03
	 	 2001-2003	 119.17	 16.10	 97.64	 178.03
	 	 	 	 	
Formula	Price	 2001	 112.77	 6.29	 102.20	 126.83
		 Dressed	Steers		 2002	 109.74	 8.79	 99.48	 127.17
	 	 2003	 135.01	 14.69	 117.98	 166.39
	 	 2001-2003	 119.24	 15.42	 99.48	 166.39
	 	 	 	 	
Forward	Contract	 2001	 112.83	 4.71	 104.05	 127.33
		 Dressed	Steers	 2002	 109.49	 6.58	 99.43	 120.97
	 	 2003	 129.70	 12.57	 113.10	 159.17
	 	 2001-2003	 117.81	 12.75	 99.43	 159.17
	 	 	 	 	
*	Year	2001	refers	to	April	2001	to	March	2002;	2002	refers	to	April	2002	to	March	2003;	and	2003	refers	to	April	2003	to	March	
2004.	 	 	
Source:	Agricultural	Marketing	Service,	U.S.	Department	of	Agriculture
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